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CH A PTER 10
Loving and being
T HE SPiR iT  A S  AgEnT of u n iT y
In earlier chapters I traced the emergence of Augustine’s account of 
the Spirit’s ‘role’ in the Trinity. We followed his early accounts of the 
Spirit’s status as that which draws us to God, as the love through which 
we are drawn, as the will and goodness of God in creation, and as the 
love between Father and Son. In the summary of Trinitarian faith at the 
beginning of De trinitate 1 we first see Augustine making reference to 
texts that identify the Spirit as the Spirit of Father and the Spirit of Son, 
such as Galatians 4.6 (‘God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts’) 
and Romans. 8.9–11 (‘the Spirit of Christ … the Spirit of Him who raised 
Christ from the dead’). This language is again mentioned in the 9th of 
his tractates on John and in summary statements in Sermon 52 and De 
trinitate 4, and then is first subject to extensive discussion in De trinitate 5 
and 6. Further extensive discussion is offered around a decade later in De 
trinitate 15, and the language is also present in many summary  contexts.1 
Augustine’s reflections on this language constitute a key plank of his 
increasingly subtle mature treatments of the Spirit.
In Book 5 Augustine tells us that the Spirit is spoken of relatively (rela-
tive dicitur) when he is said to be of the Father and of the Son; but the 
relation that is spoken of is only revealed by the title Gift. The Spirit is 
the Gift of Father (John 15.26) and of Son (Rom. 8.9) and that which 
they give is ‘some sort of ineffable communion’ (ineffabilis est quaedam 
… communio). Thus the Spirit is named something common to both – 
‘Spirit’ – that we might know that it is their communion that we receive.2 
1 See Io. ev. tr. 9. 7 and Trin. 1. 4.7, 1. 8.18, 4. 20.29. The relevant texts from Books 5–6 and 15 are 
discussed below. For the use of this language in summary statements and short discussions see, 
for example, Io. ev. tr. 9. 7 (probably its first appearance after trin. 1).
2 trin. 5. 11.12 (CCSL 50. 219). While Augustine commonly speaks of the Spirit as Love, it should be 
noted that he also frequently supplements this with other possible titles and with important qual-
ifiers – the Spirit as ‘something common’. In large part, I suspect he does so because Scripture 
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Augustine exhorts us to remember that even though Spirit is a relative 
title here, we are speaking of a relation that goes only one way: the Gift 
is of the Father and of the Son – we should not speak of ‘the Father of 
the Spirit’ in case we think of the Spirit as another Son.3 Later in Book 5, 
Augustine also argues that the Spirit is eternally and unchangeably Gift 
(sempiterne donum) even if he is given in time.4
These various themes are drawn out a little further in Book 6:
Whether [the Holy Spirit] is the unity between [Father and Son], or their holi-
ness, or their love, or whether the unity, therefore, because he is the love, it is 
obvious that he is not one of the two. Through him both are joined together; 
through him the begotten is loved by the begetter, and in turn loves him who 
begot him; in him they preserve the unity of spirit through the bond of peace, 
not by a participation, but by their own essence [non participatione sed essen-
tia sua], not by the gift of anyone superior to themselves but by their own gift 
[neque dono superioris alicuius sed suo proprio] … Whatever the Holy Spirit is, 
therefore, it is something common [commune aliquid] between the Father and 
the Son. But this communion is consubstantial and co-eternal … and this again 
is a substance, because God is a substance, and ‘God is Love’ [1 John 4.16].5
The passage suggests as many questions as it answers, but those ques-
tions reveal important developments under way in Augustine’s thought. 
In the De fide et symbolo Augustine’s concern was to argue that the Spirit 
could be conceived of as irreducible even as he was also a relation between 
Father and Son. Here we find a far more complex set of concerns related to 
the task of conceiving the Spirit as ‘something common’. In De trinitate 5 
Augustine has already inferred the Spirit’s irreducibility from a standard 
grammatical argument: if we speak of giver and gift and of the Spirit ‘of ’ 
Father and Son as the Gift, we find the Spirit’s distinctiveness insinu-
ated in Scripture’s linguistic patterns. But, in the last sentence of the pas-
sage from Book 6 quoted above, Augustine hints at a far more complex 
argument in his statement that because God is substantial so must love 
be. In the paragraphs immediately preceding this quotation Augustine 
predicates of the Spirit a number of common titles which must be identical in God – each one 
thus escaping the analogies that present themselves in the created order. The complexity of the 
Spirit’s existence as fully ‘person’ and yet as that which is given by Father to Son, as the essence of 
Father and Son – a theme explored later in this chapter – only enhances the mystery of the Spirit’s 
existence and the difficulty of naming. But, for Augustine, this difficulty stems not from a failure 
of naming on Scripture’s part, but from the fact that to understand the Spirit is to understand 
one of the deepest mysteries of the divine life.
3 trin. 5. 12.13.
4 trin. 5. 15.16–16.17. In the penultimate section of this chapter, I discuss Augustine’s description of 
Father and Son as the one principium of the Spirit.
5 trin. 6. 5.7 (CCSL 50. 235).
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has argued that if we say of Father and Son ‘God of God’ we necessarily 
signify two realities, each of which has the unique mode of existence in 
which the virtues are identical and identical with the being of those real-
ities: both ‘God’ and ‘God’ must be fully God.6 If then, the Spirit is the 
love or communion of Father and Son, and ‘God is Love’ (1John 4.16), 
then the Spirit as love must be substantial, fully identical to all that we 
might name as the ‘qualities’ of divinity, or the Spirit could not be termed 
‘God’.7 Augustine here offers an early version of his insistence that each of 
the divine three is fully the rational life of wisdom itself that defines div-
inity. This may help us to see why Augustine sees the Spirit as necessarily 
an irreducible divine ‘person’, but it forces upon us some hard questions 
about the relation between the Spirit as irreducible ‘person’ and as the 
essence of Father and Son.
In the passage from Book 6 we are examining, Augustine speaks of the 
Spirit as distinct from Father and Son and as also a gift from and of the 
essence of Father and Son. To be precise he states that Father and Son give 
their own gift, not that which they are given by another, and they are one 
in that gift not by participation but by their own essence (essentia). We 
have seen enough to rule out the possibility that Augustine understands 
Father and Son to be one because they participate in a divine substance 
prior to their individuality, and so his meaning here seems to be that ‘their 
own gift’ which is also that ‘in which’ they are one without participation 
is their own essence. In this context we should also note Augustine’s invo-
cation of 1 Corithians 6.17 (‘he who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit’). 
Someone cleaving to the Lord does not increase the Lord, and thus Father 
and Son cleaving to each other, or the Spirit doing likewise to Father and 
Son does not increase the divinity.8 This argument further reinforces the 
sense that Books 5 and 6 present the Spirit as irreducible person and as 
the essence of Father and Son. Even if this reading is correct, however, 
Augustine offers only a few clues as to the manner in which he links the 
Spirit’s existence as the essence of Father and Son and as distinct individ-
ual. Following through some of the ways in which Augustine speaks of 
6 trin. 6. 2.3–4.6.
7 With this argument should be compared Augustine’s account in ep. Io. tr. 7. 4–6. In passing it 
is worth noting how little of Augustine’s argument there depends on the possibility of reversing 
deus and dilectio in 1John 4.8. The possibility of so doing in Latin serves mostly as icing on the 
cake of his argument. The same passage also offers an important instance of Augustine using his 
second exegetical rule (as explored in Chapter 6): because love is also ‘of ’ God it must refer either 
to Son or Spirit.
8 trin. 6. 8.9.
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the Spirit in subsequent discussion may help us a little in understanding 
the direction of his thought even in De trinitate 5–7.
In the first place, if we look forward a few years to De trinitate 15, not 
surprisingly we see much greater clarity in Augustine’s discussion of the 
Spirit’s agency. Once again, while ‘gift’ itself is used by Scripture of that 
which is given to Christians for their salvation,9 Augustine contends that 
the Spirit is eternally gift on the basis of further links that he suggests 
Scripture invites us to draw.10 The term ‘gift’ is used, Augustine tells us, 
because the Spirit is also love.11 That which the Father gives us is the Spirit 
of his Son (Gal. 4.6), but the gift of the Spirit is the Spirit, and the Spirit 
is love (Rom. 5.5). ‘Love’ like ‘Spirit’ is a term which may be predicated of 
all three persons, but, Augustine argues, Scripture uses it so that when we 
grasp that the love which the Spirit gives is the Spirit, we will understand 
that the love which we receive is the love with which Father and Son 
love each other. Augustine then emphasizes the Spirit as an active giver 
of himself:
Nor because they give and he is given is he, therefore, less than they, for he is 
so given as the Gift of God that he also gives himself as God [Ita enim datur 
sicut dei donum ut etiam se ipsum det sicut deus]. For it is impossible to say of 
Him that he is not a master of his own power, of whom it was said: ‘the Spirit 
breathes where he will’ [John 3.8] … there is no subordination of the Gift and 
no  domination of the givers, but the concord between the Gift and the givers 
[concordia dati et dantium].12
The Spirit gives himself as the Father’s gift and as the Son’s gift. Father 
and Son are one because the Spirit gives himself in the begetting of the 
Son and gives himself as the Son’s love for the Father.13 This text takes us 
forward to around 420, but it may be complemented with an exegetical 
analogy that appears much earlier in Augustine’s thought.
 9 See trin. 15. 19.35.
10 See, for example, trin. 5. 16.17 (CCSL 50. 224): ‘sempiterne Spiritus donum’.
11 See trin. 15. 18.32. As we saw, the first explicit linking of the two titles occurs at fid. 9. 19. The 
association of the Gift of God with the love that is spoken of in Rom. 5.5 also begins around the 
same period, see, for example, exp. prop. Rm. 20 and 52.
12 trin. 15. 19.36 (CCSL 50. 513).
13 My language here owes something to Rowan D. Williams, ‘Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections 
on the De trinitate’, in B. Bruning et al. (eds.), Collectanea Augustiniana: Mélanges T. J. Van Bavel 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990) [= Aug(L) 40–1 (1990–1)], 1: 317–32, here 327–8: ‘The 
Spirit is “common” to Father and Son not as a quality characterizing them equally, an impersonal 
attribute, but as that active divine giving, not simply identical with the person of the Father, 
which the Father communicates to the Son to give in his turn … the Father, in eternally giving 
(divine) life to the Son, gives that life as itself a “giving” agency, for there is no pre-personal or 
sub-personal divinity; he gives the Son the capacity to give that same giving life’.
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Before we do so, however, we must note how Augustine’s reflections 
here reinforce the account of appropriation I offered at the end of Chapter 
8. Scripture identifies the third of the divine three with a name common 
to each in order to suggest a reflection on the Spirit’s existence being from 
or of God. But, unlike the case of the Son being named Wisdom, the 
appropriated title does not reveal further dimensions of the unique title; 
the Spirit is most appropriately named by a combination of appropriated 
titles – Holy and Spirit. Even when the unique title Gift provides the key 
(and Augustine does not always turn to this title), it does so because it 
reveals dimensions of the appropriated titles Holy, Spirit and Love. These 
titles must take centre stage because only meditation on them helps us to 
understand that all of the Spirit’s actions are founded in and reveal the 
Spirit’s status as the (co-equal) Spirit of Father and Son. Only by learning 
that this is so do we grasp what it means for the Spirit to be eternally gift 
and fully ‘personal’.
We see the same perspective presented perhaps a little more clearly at 
De civitate Dei 11. 24 when Augustine asks if the Spirit may be said to 
be the goodness (bonitas) of Father and Son. Without direct scriptural 
warrant Augustine hesitates, but he is willing to assert that the Spirit is 
the holiness (sanctitas) of both (not as qualitas, but as substantia and per-
sona in trinitate), because holiness is predicated of the Spirit proprie, as 
his own or properly. The divine bonitas is identical to the divine sanctitas, 
Augustine argues, and we see something of this when we ask of creation 
the three questions: who made it?; by what means, through what, was it 
made?; for what purpose was it made? We should answer that the Father 
effected creation through speaking his Word. But when we remember 
that he then ‘saw that it was good’, we can see that Scripture shows us 
the Father noting that the product accords with the blessedness that was 
the reason for its creation and the end to which it is aimed. But this end 
is the Holy Spirit, the creation finds its end in rejoicing in and adhering 
to the Spirit who is the divine goodness.14 This chain of argument again 
locates Scripture’s appropriation of common titles as part of Augustine’s 
second rule of scriptural predication: Scripture appropriates to the Spirit 
terms common to each of the divine three in order to show the character 
of the Spirit’s derivation from and consubstantiality with the Father. To 
14 civ. 11. 24 (CCSL 47. 343–4). I return to this passage of civ., which dates from c.416–18, at the 
beginning of Chapter 11. In this passage I assume proprie is used somewhat loosely. Augustine 
does not think that sanctitas is the Spirit’s proprium in a technical sense, and thus here he must be 
only indicating that the combination of sanctitas and spiritus identifies this particular referent of 
spiritus.
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see this dependence and equivalence is to see the true mystery of God’s 
love for and immediate presence to his creation.
ACTS 4 .32
In his 14th tractate on John, which has been dated to both 406–7 and 
c.413, Augustine writes that Father and Son are not be spoken of as two 
Gods, as Gods individually,
For so great is the love of the Holy Spirit there [tanta enim ibi est caritas Spiritus 
Sancti], so great the peace of unity that when it is asked about each one, let 
your answer be ‘God’; when it is asked about the Trinity, let your answer be 
‘God’. For if the spirit of man is one spirit when it cleaves to God, since the 
Apostle clearly says ‘He who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit’ [1Cor. 6.17], how 
much more is the Son as equal, cleaving to the Father, one God together with 
him … Hear a second testimony … ‘They had one soul and one heart toward 
the Lord’ [Acts 4.32]. If the love from so many souls made one soul and from 
so many hearts made one heart, how great is the love between Father and 
Son?15
The first sentence of the quotation links the power of the Holy Spirit’s 
love and the rules of predication that govern our speech about the divine 
unity: the love and peace that the Spirit produces is such, not simply that 
God is one, but that we must confess the equality of the divine three and 
their unity. In Tractate 18 – discussed at length in Chapter 9 – Augustine 
is a little more direct about the active role of the Spirit: if the love which 
God sent and which makes one heart and soul out of many, how much 
more are Father and Son one ‘in the fount of love’ (in fonte dilectionis)?16 
It is interesting that this increasing clarity about the Spirit as the active 
agent of the divine unity appears in the very set of tractates where we 
found Augustine’s mature reading of John 5.19. The parallel between 
these pneumatological passages and the Christological set examined in 
Chapter 9 continues: Augustine’s mature reading of Acts 4.32 appears 
15 Io. ev. tr. 14. 9 (CCSL 36. 147–8). Acts 4.32. ‘Anima una et cor unum’ is the most common ver-
sion of the key phrase of the verse in Augustine, but he knows more than one version. See M.-F. 
Berrouard, ‘La première communauté de Jérusalem comme image de l’unité de la Trinité. Une 
des exégèses augustiniennes d’Act 4, 32’, in Homo Spiritalis. Festgabe für Luc Verheijen (Würzburg: 
Augustines-Verlag 1987), 207–24. In what follows I treat only Acts 4.32. A similar case could be 
made by following Augustine’s reading of 1Cor. 6.17. See the early use at trin. 6. 3 and later uses 
at serm. 238. 2, serm. 241. 2, conl. Max. 14 and 15. 20, 1. 10, 2. 10.2, 2. 20.1, 2. 22.2. In this case, 
Augustine speaks mostly of the Son ‘clinging’ to the Father to produce unity of substance, but 
pneumatological material is also present.
16 Io. ev. tr. 18. 4 (CCSL 36. 181–2).
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most clearly in Tractate 39, the very text in which we found Augustine 
speaking of Father and Son existing ad aliquid:
[if ] many souls through love are one soul, and many hearts are one heart, what 
does the very fountain of love do in the Father and the Son? … If, therefore, ‘the 
love of God [which] has been poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who 
has been given to us’ [Rom. 5.5] makes many souls one soul and many hearts 
one heart, how much more does [the Spirit] make the Father and the Son and 
the Holy Spirit one God, one light, one principium? [si ergo caritas Dei … multa 
corda facit unum cor, quanto magis pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, Deus unus, 
lumen unum, unumque principium?]17
The same analogy also appears in a number of texts addressed directly 
to Homoians or Homoian converts to the Catholic faith, including his 
debate with the Homoian bishop Maximinus in 427.18 Thus, following a 
pattern we have already traced in a number of contexts, clear statement 
of the Spirit as active lover and active agent of unity within the Godhead 
appears most clearly c.420, even if it seems to lie just beneath the surface 
of texts from around a decade earlier.
The striking character of Augustine’s reading of Acts 4.32, even in its 
earliest forms, may be seen in comparison with his sources. The passage 
from Tractate 14 quoted above probably draws directly on Ambrose, De 
fide 1. 2:
if in all those who believed there was, as it is written, one soul and one heart 
[Acts 4.32], and if everyone who cleaves to the Lord is one Spirit [1Cor. 6.17], 
as the Apostle has also said, if a man and his wife are one flesh, if all we mortal 
men are, so far as regards our nature, of one substance [quantum ad naturam 
pertinet, unius substantiae sumus]: if this is what Scripture says of created persons, 
that, being many, they are one, who can in no way be compared to the divine 
persons [quorum nulla potest esse cum divinis comparatio], how much more are 
the Father and Son one in divinity, with whom there is no difference either of 
substance or of will?19
Ambrose is the only Latin pro-Nicene to use Acts 4.32 as an analogy for 
the Trinity and he does so only here. The fact that in this text he uses 
Acts 4.32 alongside 1 Corinthians 6.17 seems to mark it as Augustine’s 
source. But note the difference. Ambrose draws the sort of parallel one 
finds in a number of his Greek contemporaries between the unity of 
human beings in a universal nature and the unity of the divine persons. 
17 Io. ev. tr. 39. 5 (CCSL 36. 348).
18 ep. 238. 2 11; ep. 170. 5; conl. Max. 12; symb. cat. (= serm. 398) 4.
19 Ambrose, fid. 1. 2.18 (CSEL 78. 10–11).
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He gives us little clue about the sort of universal he envisages and insists 
anyway that ‘no comparison’ is possible. Augustine uses the same texts 
as part of a far more complex suggestion about the effect of the persons’ 
activity towards each other. Augustine’s analogy does not rely on draw-
ing consequences from the existence of a universal and unitary nature, 
but on the dynamic language of agents producing unity. Augustine’s 
very personal reading of Acts 4.32 reflects the same theology that we 
found in his way of contributing to the long exegetical tradition con-
cerning John 5.19.
T HE SPiR iT  A nd T HE l i fE  of T HE di v inE T HR EE
This exegesis of Acts 4.32 can now draw us back to the balance Augustine 
seeks between speaking of the Spirit as irreducible ‘person’ and as the 
essence of Father and Son. The complementarity of Augustine’s mature 
accounts of Son and Spirit suggests with even greater force a vision of 
the divine communion as constituted by the intra-divine acts of the div-
ine three, in an order eternally established by the Father. While Augustine 
does not simply identify the Spirit with the act of loving or self-giving – 
he uses nouns such as dilectio or amor rather than verbal or participial 
forms – the equation is clear enough. The Spirit is the communion of 
Father and Son which, as we have seen, is a mutual act of adherence and 
love; the Spirit is the love and the fount of love between Father and Son 
who eternally gives himself; the Spirit, as also ‘God from God’, shares 
in the simple mode of divine existence in which he is what he might be 
thought to possess. Thus, in these mature texts, Augustine presents the 
Spirit as the agent identical to the act of communion between Father 
and Son.
But Augustine is not suggesting that Father and Son are somehow 
brought into unity by the gift of the Spirit as an act subsequent to the 
generation of the Son. It makes sense only to read him as saying that the 
Father from eternity establishes the Son as one who is all that the Father 
is, and as one who loves the Father in and with the love that is God from 
God and also all that the Father is. The Father establishes the Son as one 
who also has as his essence the love that is identical with the essence of 
God, of the Father, but that love is also the active agent of his love for 
the Father. It seems true to say then both that the Son loves the Father 
and that the Spirit is the love and communion which joins Father and 
Son in love – the Son both loves (being himself love itself) and the Spirit 
is the love with which he loves. But, again, this is to offer a summary of 
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emergent themes that Augustine himself never does, and even this sum-
mary misses a layer of complexity.
In the case of the Son we spoke of titles and relationships that were 
unique to him: in the case of the Spirit the picture is much more com-
plex because the title ‘love’ is appropriated. A passage from De trinitate 15 
quoted in the first section of the chapter may now help to reveal the com-
plexity this creates:
(28) … we should so conceive these three [memory, understanding, will] as some 
one thing which all have, parallel to wisdom itself, and which is so retained in 
the nature of each one, as that he who has it, is that which he has … 
(29) … in that simple and highest nature, substance is not one thing, and love 
another, but that substance itself is love, and that love itself is substance, whether 
in the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, and yet the Holy Spirit is properly 
called love.20
Once again, because there is one simple and divine nature, we must 
be careful not to speak only of each of the divine three as fullness, with-
out also noting that the fullness they possess in such a way that they are 
 identical with it, is the one fullness that is God. And thus we  cannot 
speak simply as if the Spirit as person were the essence of Father and Son. 
That the Spirit is named as love should not lead us towards a  picture of 
Father and Son having as their essence something that is not their own, 
not identical with them. Rather, we must say both that Father and Son are 
in their essence love and that the Spirit is the love of Father and Son and 
fully another beside and in them. There is no impersonal or  pre-personal 
essence of the persons; Father, Son and Spirit have an essence that is 
their own, which is eternally one, and also which is the Spirit. When 
Augustine notes the difficulty of grasping why the Spirit is named by 
terms common to each of the divine three, the difficulty does not only 
consist in the basic problem of understanding how divine love must also 
be irreducible ‘ person’, it also consists in the extra complexity that reveals 
itself once we grasp how Father and Son are also love and love itself.21 
There is no ‘essence’ before the divine ‘persons’, and yet the persons are 
each identically the fullness of the Godhead, and must also in some sense 
be the others’ essence. Thus the summary that I offered in the previous 
paragraph based almost entirely on the agential language of the ‘inter-
personal’ acts of the divine three certainly corresponds to a central line of 
thought in the mature Augustine, but more is required.
20 trin. 15. 17.28–9.  21 trin. 15. 17.27.
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The French Benedictine theologian Ghislain Lafont has written very 
suggestively about the importance of ‘redoublement’ – reduplication or 
repetition – in Trinitarian theology. If we are to do any justice to the 
mystery revealed in scriptural language, Lafont argues, we must describe 
the same ground twice over, using the language of irreducible persons 
and the language of a unity of essence and will. It is not simply that we 
should have available language for both ‘levels’ of Trinitarian discussion, 
but that we need to understand how speaking about the divine three as 
‘persons’ involves showing that those ‘persons’ each possess the divine 
essence in a particular mode, and how speaking about the divine essence 
involves showing that essence to exist through and as subsisting rela-
tions.22 The language of the last sentence should betray that for Lafont 
and a number of his best recent adapters, the high point of the process is 
reached in Thomas’s peculiarly sophisticated articulation of Trinitarian 
terminology.23
I suggest that there are in fact many forms of ‘redoublement’ to be 
found in Trinitarian tradition, and that the tensions we see in the mature 
Augustine offer important and distinct examples from the Thomistic 
patterns to which those who have recently sought to appropriate Lafont 
have (rightly) pointed. Augustine’s pattern of ‘redoublement’ does not 
proceed via an examination of the language of persons and essence, but 
22 Ghislain Lafont, Peut-on Connaître Dieu en Jésus-Christ? (Paris: Cerf, 1969), esp. 130, 160 and 
234, here 130: ‘Si nous reprenons l’ensemble de ces précisions sur le langage, il apparaît que 
l’expression trinitaire obéit à ce que l’on pourrait appeler une loi de redoublement: pour dire un 
aspect quelconque du Mystère, il faut toujours employer en succession continue deux formulas 
qui, sans doute, se complètent, le Révèlation nous en est garante, mais dont nous ne pouvons sai-
sir que la non-contradiction. l’aspect positif de la coexistence des aspects soulignés par ces formu-
las est reconnu dans la foi, sans que la raison puisse faire autre chose que le pressentir. C’est qu’en 
effet, ces deuz formulas nécessaires sont le plus souvent en position dialectique l’une par rapport 
à l’autre: d’un côte on affirme l’identité (de l’essence avec le relation, de la relation avec la proces-
sion, etc.) et de l’autre on affirme le non-identité (des même termes sous un autre rapport), et il ne 
s’agit pas là seulement de prises de vue logiques; le Mystère tient précisément à ce que identité et 
non-identité sont également réelles au moins en certains cas, quand il s’agit de l’être et de la ratio, 
bien que non sur le même plan.’ At p. 234, Lafont speaks more clearly of the need for a number of 
different reduplications, but this point is not discussed at length. I disagree with Lafont’s wider 
account at two key points: I do not share his narrative of the supposed separation between theolo-
gia and oikonomia after Nicaea, nor his narrative in which the mistakes of the Cappadocians are 
partially rectified by Augustine but only fully overcome in the synthesis of Thomas. For an excel-
lent critique, see André D’Halleux, ‘Personnalisme ou Essentialisme Trinitaire chez Les Pères 
Cappadociens’, in Patrologie et Oecuménisme. Recueil d’ études (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 
1990), 215–68.
23 See, for examples, Gilles Emery, ‘Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God in 
St Thomas Aquinas?’, in Trinity in Aquinas (Ypsilanti, MI: Sapientia Press, 2003), 165–208; 
Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), esp. 214ff.
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via the interweaving of two strands of exegesis and philosophical reflec-
tion. The first strand focuses on the divine three as active agents, and 
here Augustine seems to have moved cautiously towards an account of the 
three as existing dynamically ad aliquid. Such discussions culminate a 
line of argument emergent since Augustine’s earliest attempts to state that 
there is nothing ‘in’ the Trinity other than the three persons. We can per-
haps speak of a certain ‘analogical personalism’ here. The term ‘person-
alism’ is used in many senses: I mean by the term Augustine’s insistence 
that the divine irreducible rational life and self-presence is essential to 
being God, such that there can be no pre-personal divine.24 In this sense 
divine personhood is the fundamental unit of Augustine’s Trinitarian 
ontology. Interestingly, Augustine’s rejection of person and nature lan-
guage is in favour of this ‘personalism’ in which, from the Father as princi-
pium, the divine three (each of whom is and all of whom together are the 
divine rational life) eternally constitute the ‘one substance’ of the Trinity. 
‘Analogical’ is, however, the necessary qualifier of ‘personalism’ because 
Augustine is clear about the ways in which divine ‘persons’ transcend 
human persons and the categories that we use to speak of them.25
The second strand of discourse focuses on the divine three as each being 
the one fullness of the Godhead and as also the fullness of the indivis-
ible Godhead inseparably with the others. The relationship of irreducible 
24 In using the term I am not arguing that Augustine makes any extensive equation between the 
‘personal’ nature of God and the ultimately or foundationally ‘personal’ nature of the created 
order as an ontological principle. He does, of course, treat the ‘highest’ form of created existence 
as the inherently personal rational life of those made in imagine Dei.
25 Andrew Louth in ‘Love and the Trinity: Saint Augustine and the Greek Fathers’, AugStud 33 
(2002), 1–16, is one of the few recent authors to speak of Augustine’s ‘personalism’, but he does so 
as a form of critique. I disagree with Louth’s article in three respects. First, Augustine describes 
the Spirit as the love between Father and Son well before trin. 5–6 and the theme appears from 
a wide matrix of contexts, not simply an observation of the Spirit’s function among Christians. 
Augustine’s early order pneumatology in which the Spirit perfects the creation and draws it to 
God is of particular importance. At the same time, Augustine’s attempts to link this theology to 
an account of what it means for the Spirit to be common to Father and Son or a res naturae seem 
to draw on a wider pro-Nicene dynamic. Second, Louth overlooks Augustine’s consistent expres-
sion of the impossibility of our understanding fully what we are able to say about the divine 
communion, and especially about the individual existence of each of the divine three. Augustine 
does not, as I hope to have shown, ‘[move] between human and divine love without much sense 
of difference’ (p. 6). Third, but beyond the scope of this book, I am not as certain as Louth 
that Augustine’s Greek contemporaries offer quite such a consistent account of which scriptural 
texts speak of theologia and which of oikonomia. That division is still under development (see the 
discussions of Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, Divine Simplicity in Basil of Caesarea (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010)). Of course, there are significant differences between Augustine and his 
Greek (and Latin contemporaries) here: but I do not think those differences are best identi-
fied by presenting Augustine as differing because of an epistemological hubris. For discussion of 
another, Catholic, personalist reading of Augustine, see my ‘Sempiterne Spiritus Donum’.
 
 
 
 
Into the mystery262
persons to each other, to the one essence that God is, is not explored by 
manipulation of a genus or species terminology. It is explored in part by 
Augustine’s use of some basic principles of divine simplicity to articu-
late the divine processions such that no division of the divine essence is 
involved even as each person is the fullness of that essence; in part by care-
fully placed insistence that appropriated titles do shape our understanding 
of a divine individual, but only by also showing how that individual is 
necessarily so absolutely ‘personal’ because they are identical to the one 
divine fullness. Thus, the case of appropriated titles offers a particularly 
clear example of the way in which this second strand of discourse exists in 
a mutual relationship with the first. This second level of discourse thus also 
has an ‘apophatic’ function, forcing upon us one key point at which the 
Trinitarian mystery escapes our thought (let alone our speech): the unity 
of the persons despite their irreducibility. A similar ‘apophatic’ function is 
of course seen also at the first level; Augustine’s discussions of the persons 
in that manner frequently emphasizes the difficulty of our imagining the 
lack of the accidental in the divine three, their existence simply as what we 
are always tempted to imagine them as possessing.
‘Apophatic’ is a dangerous term to apply at a time when its popular-
ity frequently robs it of dense significance: here I mean it as almost syn-
onymous with Augustine’s ineffabilis. In Trinitarian contexts ineffabilis 
seems to indicate not merely that we cannot speak of a topic; but that 
the rational order enables a process of intellectual ascent towards under-
standing, but one that enables increasing precision about how the divine 
transcends any categories available either in the material or the intelligible 
sphere.26 At the same time, Augustine sees the divine ineffability as part 
and parcel of the particular intelligible structure of the creation as reveal-
ing of its Creator, rather than as preventing us from seeing the creation 
as intelligible in this way. But something more of this relationship will 
be seen through the course of the next two chapters, in discussion of De 
trinitate 9 and 10, and I leave it until then.
26 One way of tracing Augustine’s understanding of ineffabilis is to explore how he links the term 
with intellectus or intellegere. For example, cf. ord. 2. 7.24 and qu. XVI in Matt. 13. At ep. 242. 
5, written to the ‘Arian’ Elpidius, Augustine writes: ‘there are many things which may be said 
about the ineffability of the Trinity, not in order that it may be expressed in words – otherwise it 
would not be ineffable – but in order that it may be understood from the words that are said that 
it cannot be understood in words’. The ineffable is thus not simply resistant to understanding 
or speech, but requires of us a specific mode of understanding, one that finds its completion in 
confession of transcendence even as it achieves. Augustine is not, however, ‘apophatic’ if that is 
taken to necessarily include a ps. Dionysian sense of God’s transcending of ever Goodness and 
Being.
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A nd ‘fRom’  T HE Son?
It is enough for the Christian to believe that the only cause of all created things, 
whether heavenly or earthly, whether visible or invisible, is the goodness of the 
Creator, the one true God; and that nothing exists but himself that does not 
derive its existence from Him; and that He is the Trinity – to wit, the Father, 
and the Son begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the 
same Father, but one and the same Spirit of Father and Son.27
In the final two sections of this chapter I want to consider two ques-
tions that follow from my discussion of the divine three and their inter-
personal acts. The first concerns one of the most hotly disputed questions 
about Augustine’s pneumatology: his account of ‘double procession’. The 
brief discussion I offer here is intended to show, first, that this account 
flows from some of the principles I have just outlined and, second, how 
it thus not only escapes some of the criticisms frequently aimed at it, but 
also suggests a number of lines for investigation that could lead debate on 
this question in new directions.
I will begin by turning to one of his most extended mature discussions 
of the question. At De trinitate 15. 17.29 Augustine famously writes:
only he from whom the Son was begotten and from whom the Spirit principally 
[principaliter] proceeds, is God the Father. I have added principally therefore 
because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son. But the Father 
also gave this to him, not as though he already existed and did not yet have it 
[non iam exsistenti et nondum habenti], but whatever he gave to the only-begotten 
Word, he gave by/in begetting him [sed quidquid unigenito verbo dedit gignendo 
dedit]. He so begot him, therefore, that the common gift should also proceed 
from him, and that the Holy Spirit should be the Spirit of both.28
This passage is frequently used to demonstrate that Augustine  envisages 
the Father as principium within the Trinity. But I think it equally import-
ant that we see the extent to which Augustine is here simply filling 
out a picture we have already seen him sketch. Note that Augustine 
equates the Father’s giving to the Son that the Spirit proceed from him 
with the Father’s establishing the Spirit as the Spirit of Father and Son. 
Thus the Father’s begetting of the Son is identical with the establishment 
27 ench. 3. 9.
28 trin 15. 17.29 (CCSL 50. 503). Fundamental for interpreting Augustine’s discussion of pneuma-
tology in trin. 15 is Basil Studer, ‘Zur Pneumatologie des Augustinus von Hippo (De Trinitate 
15.17.27–27.50)’, in Mysterium Caritatis: Studien zur Exegese und zur Trinitätslehre in der Alten 
Kirche, Studia Anselmiana 127 (Rome: Pontifico Ateneo S. Anselmo, 1999), 311–27. Studer shows 
clearly how this discussion should not be interpreted solely in terms of the mental ‘analogy’ 
developed in trin. 8–15.
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of the communion of Father, Son and Spirit because in the begetting of the 
Son the Father gives his love (or substance), thus eternally establishing 
the Son as lover of the Father and the Spirit as the personal giving love of 
Father and Son.
Augustine further refines his argument a little later in Book 15:
And he who can understand in that which the Son says: ‘as the Father has life in 
himself, so he has given to the Son to have life in himself ’ [John 5.26], that the 
Father did not give life to the Son already existing without life, but so begot him 
apart from time that the life which the Father gave to the Son by/in begetting is 
co-eternal with the life of the Father who gave [sed ita eum sine tempore genuisse 
ut uita quam pater filio gignendo dedit coaeterna sit uitae patris qui dedit]; let him 
understand that, just as the Father has in himself that the Holy Spirit should 
proceed from the Father, it is so to be understood that his proceeding also from 
the Son comes to the Son from the Father [de patre habet utique ut et de illo pro-
cedat spiritus sanctus].29
Augustine also quotes at this point from Tractate 99:
the Holy Spirit has it from the Father himself that he proceeds also from the 
Son, just as he proceeds from the Father.30
Augustine has refined his argument by speaking not so much of the role 
of the Father in relationship to the Son, but of the Father’s relationship to 
the Spirit, and in so doing he emphasizes the importance of viewing the 
Father as the cause and source of the Trinitarian communion. The ques-
tion of the Father’s principium here should detain us a little further.
In the De fide et symbolo of 393 Augustine tells us that the Spirit is said 
to come from the Father so that we know there to be only one princip-
ium. The derivation of Son and Spirit from the Father prevents Christians 
from proposing a plurality of divine principles who would necessarily 
require a further principle common to them all.31 In De trinitate 5, how-
ever, Augustine asks whether the Son can be said to be the Spirit’s prin-
cipium. If the Spirit does proceed also from the Son Augustine sees this 
predication as possible, but he immediately adds that only as the Father 
and Son are one Lord in relation to the creation are they one principium 
in relation to the Spirit.32
To understand this comment we must look to the paragraphs that pre-
cede it. Augustine has just argued that Father and Son are both named 
Creator, but are one principium in relation to the created order. They 
29 trin 15. 26.47 (CCSL 50. 528).  30 trin. 15. 27.48 and Io. ev. tr. 99. 8.
31 fid. 9. 19.  32 trin. 5. 14.15.
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are one principium because they are one God.33 I suggest that this com-
ment, in turn, needs to be interpreted in the light of Augustine’s mature 
account of inseparable operation. As we have seen, in that account, the 
Father elects from eternity to work always through the Son. And thus, we 
can perhaps take Augustine to be arguing that just as creation is worked 
by the Father through the Son, so too the Spirit proceeds from the Father, 
but proceeds as the Father’s eternal gift to the Son and eternally as the 
Son’s love given (and giving itself) to the Father. In which case, Augustine 
tries to suggest, because the Father eternally works through the Son he 
eternally establishes it in generating the Son that both Father and Son are 
the principium of the Spirit.
But Augustine here is pressing on into territory for which no maps 
were (or are) available, and it is significant that apart from this one text in 
De trinitate 5 Augustine never again speaks in this manner of Father and 
Son as the one principium of the Spirit. Instead, we see him develop the 
formulae I quoted above, stating that the Father gives it to the Son and 
to the Spirit that the Spirit proceeds also from the Son. Such formulae 
allow him to avoid the unwanted connotations that might follow from 
describing the Son as also principium. In 427, against the ‘Arian’ bishop 
Maximinus, Augustine writes: ‘when the Son spoke of the Spirit he said 
“He proceeds from the Father”, because the Father is the author [auctor] 
of his procession. The Father begot a Son and, by begetting him, gave 
it to him that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him’.34 Gerald Bonner cor-
rectly comments that this passage demonstrates Augustine’s continuing 
concern to find a way of distinguishing the roles of Father and the Son in 
the Spirit’s procession, even as the Spirit is the Spirit of both.35 Augustine’s 
account of the Father’s principium does not, thus, involve him so much in 
compromising the Father’s status as principium, but in suggesting to us 
that for the Father to act eternally as principium is for the Father eternally 
to give rise to two who share the divine fullness and through whom the 
Father eternally works. The Father’s status as principium is thus not that 
of an autonomous agent who stands ‘above’ Son and Spirit, but one who 
works eternally through the Son and Spirit he generates and spirates.
Augustine never discusses directly the extent to which we can speak 
of the Spirit having a role in the Son’s generation. But because Augustine 
envisages the Father eternally constituting the Son through giving him 
his own personal and active Spirit who is love, we do seem to be able 
33 trin. 5. 13.14.  34 c. Max. 2. 5.
35 Gerald Bonner, ‘St Augustine’s Doctrine of the Holy Spirit’, Sobornost 4/1 (1960), 51–66.
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to conclude that the Son is generated in the Spirit. But this supposition 
remains just that. I suspect Augustine never discusses this question because 
of the lack of significant scriptural warrant, and because of his commit-
ment to the standard taxis of Father–Son–Spirit. We find ourselves in the 
presence of ideas that certainly seem to follow from more well-established 
principles, but which demand of us a great deal of reserve when Scripture 
provides us with so little. Noting, however, that this might seem to be an 
implication of Augustine’s presentation helps us to see even more clearly 
that Augustine does not see the Son as possessing any secondary media-
torial role in the eternal procession of the Spirit. This is so because our 
 question about the possible role of the Spirit in the generation of the Son 
only arises because Augustine is clear that the Spirit comes from the Father 
to the Son as the fullness of divinity, as the personal loving that constitutes 
the Son as fully God in the Trinitarian life. The Son’s seeing of and love 
for the Father occurs because the Son is the fullness of the divinity and in 
some sense has the Spirit as his essence: if the Spirit ‘proceeds’ from the 
Son it is because this is the manner in which the Father is eternally the sole 
Trinitarian ‘cause’.
Noting that Augustine pushes tentatively in this direction is of rele-
vance for modern debate over the filioque. Fundamental to recent dis-
cussions between Catholic and Orthodox theologians has been the 1995 
‘clarification’ on the meaning of the filioque produced under the auspices 
of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity.36 Much of the 
text focuses on identifying what it takes to be persistent confusions in 
terminology between Latin and Greek traditions, and on establishing an 
outline history of the controversy. The concluding paragraphs of the text, 
however, suggest that Western understandings of filioque do not contra-
vene assertion of the Father’s priority in the Trinitarian life. One of the 
most interesting tactics pursued in these paragraphs is the dual argument 
that, first, it is ‘in’ the Spirit that the relationship between Father and Son 
achieves ‘Trinitarian perfection’ and that, second, the Father generates 
the Son ‘by breathing through Him the Holy Spirit’.
36 ‘The Greek and Latin Traditions Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit’, issued by the 
Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, L’Osservatore Romano (weekly English-
language edition) n. 38 (1408), 20 Sept. 1995 (originally in French in L’Osservatore Romano n. 
211 (41.050) 13 Sept. 1995). For a particularly helful outline of the history involved here, see Brian 
E. Daley, ‘Revisiting the “Filioque”: Roots and Branches of an Old Debate. Part One’, Pro 
Ecclesia 10 (2001), 31–62; Daley, ‘Revisiting the “Filioque”. Part Two: Contemporary Catholic 
Approaches”, Pro Ecclesia 10 (2001), 195–212.
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This second point is phrased thus, I suspect, to serve the wider goal of 
suggesting the ecumenical possibilities of our speaking of the Spirit pro-
cessing through the Son. Whether or not ‘through the Son’ as understood 
in current Catholic/Orthodox discussion adequately captures Augustine’s 
intent, the terse sentences in this document do parallel some key themes 
in Augustine’s presentation. The Father’s giving of the Spirit to the Son 
is intrinsic to his generation of the Son as the one who loves the Father 
with the fullness of divine love. This line of thought has not, however, 
been much pursued subsequently. As an indication it may be noted that 
the otherwise very helpful document produced by the North American 
Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation in 2003 sees itself as follow-
ing down a path opened by the earlier Vatican document, but offers no 
discussion of this theme.37 This latter text builds on the first by suggesting 
further clarification of the range of meaning inherent in the Latin pro-
cedere, and by arguing that Latins use the term in a sense which accords 
the Father the status of ‘primordial source’ and ‘ultimate cause’ in the 
Trinity. But it shies away from pursuing the hints I identified in the final 
paragraphs of the 1995 ‘clarification’.38
The documents I have mentioned here tend to focus their energies on 
(what some Orthodox theologians present as the traditional Catholic 
 tactic of) arguing historically that distinctions between Greek and Latin 
pneumatologies are mainly matters of terminological confusion. At the 
same time they struggle to suggest formulae that may point an ecumen-
ical way forward. My sense, however, is that much work remains to be 
done looking in some detail at the variety of different accounts of double 
procession and at the wider contexts within which they occur.39 It may 
well be that the Latin procedere covers distinctions between a number 
of Greek verbs, and that it is ecumenically helpful to note the confu-
sions that have resulted, but Augustine’s texts suggest to us that we need 
also to pay close attention to the ways in which the very flexibility of the 
verb means that it can be used to raise questions about how the Father 
37 ‘The Filioque: A Church Dividing Issue?’, 25 Oct. 2003. Available at http://www.usccb.org/seia/
filioque.shtml.
38 See the useful parallel discussion and critique of David Coffey, ‘The Roman “Clarification” of 
the Doctrine of the Filioque’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 5 (2003), 3–21.
39 One of the strongest and most eloquent critiques of the Vatican ‘Clarification’ comes from Jean-
Claude Larchet, ‘La Question du “Filioque”’, Le Messager Orthodoxe 129 (1998), 3–58. My reading 
of Augustine differs in almost every particular, but one parallel between Larchet and the ‘clarifi-
cation’ is the tendency to offer a narrative distinction between positions within the tradition that 
divides those traditions far too easily into clear units. Further progress may perhaps be achieved 
by questioning further this tactic.
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to be principium within the Trinitarian life. The wide semantic range of 
the verb means that we must examine with some care its actual use and, 
when we do so, note the broader theological questions about the character 
of the divine life that are raised.40
SubSiST ing R El AT ionS?
For many of those modern writers on Trinitarian theology who are 
strongly critical of ‘Western’ approaches, the idea of the divine persons as 
‘subsistent relations’ has been read as not only intertwined with, but also 
dependent on, Trinitarian theologies that (often implicitly) rely on mod-
els of ‘internal’ self-relatedness.41 It is moreover seen as a doctrine that 
either begins with Augustine or at least is the outworking of principles 
he establishes. This brief discussion is intended to show the complexities 
inherent in exploring the relationship between Thomas and Augustine on 
this question.
As both Augustine’s and Thomas’s texts are often misinterpreted in 
broad narratives of Western theology’s failure, I will first spend a few 
moments with one key text from Thomas’s Summa Theologiae. The notion 
of relatio subsistens – ‘subsisting relation’ – arises against the background 
of a debate concerning whether ‘person’ in God signifies the divine sub-
stance (or essence) or whether it signifies the relatio, the distinctive char-
acter of the divine person.42 Thomas distinguishes his position from a 
number of alternatives. Person cannot signify the divine essence as does 
the word ‘God’, because then any use of person in the plural is an accom-
modation to which little sense can be attached. Perhaps, then, person 
directly refers to the divine essence and indirectly ‘co-signifies’ a rela-
tion: this opinion actually takes us little further as the problems with the 
term ‘ person’ remain. Perhaps we can reverse this opinion and suggest 
40 We should note that Augustine understands ‘procession’ to be incomprehensible every bit as 
clearly as does Gregory Nazianzen.
41 For example, William Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation 
(Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 61: ‘the fullest implications of 
Augustine’s thought are that God is one “person”, within whose divine consciousness there is a 
threefold self-relatedness’. It may be that some Neo-Thomists offer ammunition to those seeking 
to make such charges in offering a narrative of Thomas’s ‘completing’ Augustine precisely by 
giving a more focused alignment of Son and Spirit with mental faculties, but it is vital to avoid 
projecting onto Thomas Neo-Thomist positions without careful examination. For example, see 
Reginald Garrigou-LaGrange, The Trinity and God the Creator: A Commentary on St Thomas’s 
Theological Summa Ia, q. 27–119, trans. F. C. Eckhoff (St Louis: Herder, 1952), 68.
42 My account here owes much to that found in Emery’s The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas 
Aquinas, 114ff.
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that person refers primarily to the relation and secondarily to the divine 
essence. This appears to have been the position of William of Auxerre.
Thomas finds this last opinion fruitful, but insufficient insofar as it 
does not seem to do justice to the full individuality, the being for itself, 
of a person. Accordingly, he develops William’s solution, emphasizing 
that in God relations cannot exist as accidental to the divine essence: they 
must subsist just as does the divine essence. But, at the same time, for the 
word ‘person’ to be used appropriately, it must signify that which most 
truly distinguishes one person from another. The solution, then, is this: ‘a 
divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify rela-
tion by way of a substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in 
the divine nature.’ 43 Continuing, Thomas writes that ‘person’ thus can be 
said to signify relation directly, but only insofar as it signifies the relation 
expressed in the hypostasis that Father, Son or Spirit is. This move then 
permits Thomas to say that ‘person’ can also be said to signify essence dir-
ectly, as long as we understand that this is because essence and hypostasis 
are the same, the essence expressed by means of the hypostasis/relation (a 
point to be noted by any who would argue that a ‘relation’ of necessity 
indicates a lesser degree of irreducibility than the category of ‘person’ or 
‘hypotasis’!). Thomas’s move is sophisticated and yet dependent on the 
application of fairly simple principles, the lack of anything accidental in 
God and the impropriety of understanding the divine essence to be dis-
tinct from the persons.
Thomas’s understanding of a divine person as a subsisting relation 
needs also to be read in the context of his account of the unique char-
acter of relations of origin. Among the various kinds of relation that 
Thomas identifies is that of a relation which is ‘real’ – that is, a relation 
which exists ‘in the nature of things’ and not purely logically, existing 
only by way of conceptual abstraction – in both of two things related. 
Thomas argues that such relations in God must be founded on activ-
ity, and thus on the Father’s generating of the Son and spirating of the 
Spirit.44 Remembering this account of real relations in God helps because 
it reinforces the extent to which Thomas sees the persons, as subsisting 
43 ST. 1. q. 29. a. 4. resp.: ‘Distinctio autem in divinis non fit nisi per relationes originis, ut dictum 
est supra. Relatio autem in divinis non est sicut accidens inhaerens subiecto, sed est ipsa divina 
essentia, unde est subsistens, sicut essentia divina subsistit. Sicut ergo deitas est Deus, ita pater-
nitas divina est Deus pater, qui est persona divina. Persona igitur divina significat relationem 
ut subsistentem. Et hoc est significare relationem per modum substantiae quae est hypostasis 
subsistens in natura divina’.
44 ST. 1. q. 28 a. 4, resp.
 
 
 
 
Into the mystery270
relations, existing because of the Father’s eternal and ordered activity of 
generating and spirating.45
Some of the differences between Thomas and Augustine may now be 
apparent. As we have seen, Augustine simply does not offer (and may 
strategically wish to avoid) the sort of logical and philosophical preci-
sion so central to Thomas’s exposition. We have seen many examples of 
this distinction through the course of the book: it may also be worth 
nothing that Augustine does not even offer clear definitions of the four 
traditional scholastic relations (paternitas, filiatio, spiratio and processio).46 
Nor do we see anything like Thomas’s speculative attempt to  demonstrate 
that the existence of real relations between the persons would divide the 
Godhead.47 Thomas inhabits a scholastic culture and tradition that en ables 
a very different style of work from that we see in Augustine. Thomas’s 
preference for the use of person and nature terminology found in such 
Latins as Hilary and Ambrose reflects the fact that he stands in a trad-
ition stretching from Boethius and through Alcuin and Anselm which 
was far more willing than Augustine to invest with deep significance for 
describing the structure of the Trinity a complex metaphysical termin-
ology. This is so even as we should note that Thomas himself both takes 
with full seriousness the analogical character of all our talk about God 
and is willing to state directly that the divine cannot be comprehended by 
genus and species terminologies.48
This observation can perhaps be raised to the level of a general 
 principle. Scholastic Trinitarian theologies draw frequently on Augustine, 
but often under misapprehensions: Augustine becomes a source for 
 discussions and terminological distinctions in ways that he would not 
have envisaged. We can perhaps distinguish two ways in which scho-
lastics draw on Augustine’s Trinitarian theology. In the case of his dis-
cussions of love and knowledge, scholastics use Augustine in ways that 
allow us to see his texts as a central foundation for such discussion, even 
if his approach is far more tentative. As we shall see through the next 
45 I make no comment here on the complexities of Thomas’s views on the filioque.
46 ST. 1 q. 28 a. 4.
47 For discussion of these in Thomas, see Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, 
89ff.
48 For example, in sent. 1. 19.4.2. Richard Cross has suggested that such denials are a standard part 
of Western tradition after Augustine. This is an interesting claim, and I hope he will eventually 
offer a more extensive discussion of it. Even were it so, I do not think it would alter my account 
of the distinctive manner in which Augustine not only states the principle but also seeks ways 
to speak of the Trinity without reference to such language. See Richard Cross, ‘Duns Scotus on 
Divine Substance and the Trinity’, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11 (2003), 181–201.
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two chapters, Augustine’s discussions of memory, intellect and will simi-
larly have a tentative quality that is somewhat different from the imme-
diate explanatory force that Thomas (for example) assumes they possess. 
But when scholastics consider person, nature and relation (as well as later 
use of arguments about the ways in which activity reveals power and 
nature), a different situation obtains. Here scholastic Trinitarian theolo-
gies are deeply imbued with the traditions of discussing such concepts 
mentioned at the end of the last paragraph. Augustine, and especially 
some key passages of the De trinitate, are quoted as auctoritates in their 
accounts. And yet, as we have seen, Augustine actually stands out 
because of the thoroughness with which he struggles not to define but to 
avoid such terminology.
Nevertheless, despite these differences, there is a deep consonance 
between Augustine’s account of persons as constituted by their eternal 
intra-divine acts, which are in turn identical with their eternally being 
generated and spirated, and Thomas’s account of subsisting relations. 
We should, however, continue to recognize that we deal here with two 
conceptions which emerge in very different theological-rhetorical con-
texts. The differences between the theological cultures and concerns of 
Thomas and Augustine are well illustrated by noting how, in his Lectures 
on John, Thomas’s John 5.19 exegesis differs from that of Augustine. For 
Thomas, John 5.19 shows that Christ possesses divine power through his 
eternal generation and, hence, is constituted perfect in his knowledge 
and ability to act. Thomas begins his reading by accepting Augustine’s 
second  exegetical rule: John 5.19 reveals something about the Son’s 
being from the Father, but should not be taken as implying inferior-
ity.49 A little later he comments directly on the readings of Hilary and 
Chrysostom: the former he takes to argue that the Word’s eternal see-
ing of the Father indicates that the Word is eternally a perfect entity. 
The latter he takes to argue that a correct reading of the Son’s ‘cannot’ 
shows that the Son’s action conforms to the Father’s. Augustine, Thomas 
tells us, offers both of these in different contexts.50 A little before, how-
ever, Thomas has offered his own preferred reading. Seeing is a mode of 
receiving  knowledge or of the derivation of knowledge, and the Son’s 
receiving of knowledge is identical with his being generated from the 
Father’s Wisdom. Thus the Son’s ‘seeing’ is identical to his proceeding 
49 Ioan. 5, lect. 3, n. 747–8.  50 Ioan. 5, lect. 3, n. 751–3.
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from the Father by an  ‘intellectual procession’ (procedere intelligibili pro-
cessione a patre operante).51
Thomas’s solution parallels Augustine’s: both think of the Son’s seeing 
as identical to the Son’s eternal generation. And yet there are differences. 
Thomas shows a clear preference for an explanation that interprets the 
Son’s ‘seeing’ in terms of an already established metaphysical terminology. 
As part of this solution Thomas also presents the Son’s ‘seeing’ as a cipher 
for the Son’s intellectual procession. Augustine’s solution invests the Son’s 
‘seeing’ with more significance, perhaps because he easily and naturally 
interprets seeing within a Plotinian context, perhaps also because he 
assumes a very particular style of correspondence between biblical termin-
ology and divine reality itself. But despite these differences we are exam-
ining two options within a complex tradition. Augustine’s influence here 
is vast, and yet not only does his work offer us a number of possible roads 
not taken by later tradition, but that tradition itself eventually marked 
out tracks that he could not have foreseen. While we can certainly speak 
of a ‘Latin tradition’ between Augustine and Thomas, good negotiation 
of and existence within that tradition now requires of us much sensitivity 
to its own internal modulations, disputes and conversations.
51 Ioan. 5, lect. 3, n. 750.
 
 
